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NOTES
It is probable that the Court will not adhere to its distinction be-
tween presumptions imposing the risk of non-persuasion and those
merely shifting the duty of proceeding with the evidence. If it con-
tinues to require that statutory presumptions be based upon a "ra-
tional connection," it will doubtless extend this same requirement to
statutes shifting the mere duty of going forward with the evidence.2 5
It is hoped, however, that it will do neither, but will adopt the more
liberal attitude of holding every type of statutory presumption valid
where absolute liability could be imposed in the same situation,2 6
and, where absolute liability could not be imposed, of holding a
statutory presumption valid if it is -based either upon a "probable
connection" or some authorized reason of policy.
2 7
J. FRAziER GLENN, JR.
RIsK OF Loss IN BANK COLLECTIONS UNDER NORTH CAROLINA
STATUTE
As an emergency measure, North Carolina, together with a num-
ber of other states, enacted a statute1 permitting a drawee bank to
" A statute making failure to perform labor contracted for without refund-
ing the money paid therefor prima facie evidence of criminal intent was de-
clared unconstitutional although it was construed as meaning just enough
evidence to go to the jury from which they could find for either party. Bailey
v. Alabama, supra note 1. This case seems to indicate the importance placed
upon a probable connection by the Supreme Court of the United States.
" This attitude was adopted by the U. S. Supreme Court in Ferry v. Ramsay,
supra note 5.
' Since the completion of this note, and after the United States Supreme
Court's decision holding the Georgia statute unconstitutional, supra note 4, the
Court of Appeals of Georgia held this same statute constitutional on the ground
that the U. S. Supreme Court had erroneously construed the statute as shifting
the risk of non-persuasion when its proper construction, indicated by a long
line of decisions, merely required the railroad company to proceed with the
evidence. Ga. Ry. and Power Co. v. Shaw, 149 S. E. 657 (Ga., Oct. 1929). The
constitutionality of this decision will be the subject of a comment in a forth-
coming issue of this LAw REv.vW.
It should be noted that the Georgia legislature, immediately after and ap-
parently as a result of the decision in the Henderson case, supra note 4, passed
an act approved August 24, 1929, which creates a presumption of negligence
against a railroad company in the words of the Mississippi statute, held con-
stitutional in Mobile, etc. R. R. v. Turnipseed, supra note 13.
'N. C. Code 1927, §220 (aa) as enacted by N. C. Pub. Laws 1921, Ch. 20,
§2. In order to prevent the accumulation of unnecessary amounts of money in
the vaults of the banks and trust companies chartered by this state, all checks
drawn on said banks and trust companies shall, unless specified on the face
thereof to the contrary by the maker or makers thereof, be payable in ex-
change drawn on the reserve deposits of said banks, when any such check is
presented by or through any Federal Reserve Bank, postoffice or express com-
pany or any respective agent thereof. Held constitutional in Farmers' and
Merchants' Bank of Monroe v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U. S. 649, 43 S. Ct.
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pay by exchange draft an item presented to it for collection, by or
through a Federal Reserve Bank, postoffice or express company,
unless the drawer had specified on the check to the contrary. The
statute, directed only against the practices of the Federal Reserve
Bank during the par-clearance controversy, had the desired effect.2
Since then it has apparently lain dormant until recently, when two
North Carolina cases3 raised the question as to its effect upon the
rights of the payee of a check, (1) against the drawer, (2) against
the collecting bank,4 when a drawee bank in the exercise of the option
granted it, remits in payment of an item, an exchange draft which
is dishonored upon presentation.
(1) As to the payee's rights against the drawer.
It is accepted as a general rule that a check is deemed paid, and
the drawer and indorsers discharged when the item is stamped
"paid" and debited to the drawer's account by the drawee. 5  The
651 (1923), reversing state court decision, 183 N. C. 546, 112 S. E. 252 (1922).
Similar statutes have been enacted in other states: Ala. Gen. & Loc. Acts
(1920), No. 35; Fla. Gen. Laws (1921), Ch. 8532; Ga. Laws (1920), p, 107;
La. Acts (1920), No. 23; Miss. Laws (1920), Ch. 183; S. D. Laws (1921),
Ch. 31; Tenn. Pub. Acts (1921), Ch. 37.
The following statutes permit collecting banks to forward items direct to
the drawee and accept exchange in payment: Cal. Gen. Laws (1925), Ch. 312,
§5; Colo. Laws (1925), Ch. 64, p. 172; Minn. Laws (1927), Ch. 138, §1; Mont.
Laws (1925), Ch. 63, p. 85; Ore. Laws (1925), Ch. 207, §126; S. C. Laws(1927), No. 202, p. 369, having a section giving a preferred claim in the
assets of an insolvent drawee bank; N. D. Laws (1927), Ch. 92 H. B. 249.
' In order to force par clearance upon numerous southern state banks the
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond made a practice of accumulating checks
on those drawees and presenting them over the counter with a demand for cash.
This resulted in a loss of income from collection exchange charges and necessi-
tated keeping large amounts of currency on hand. See C. T. Murchison, Par
Clearance of Checks (1922), I N. C. L. Rav. 133; SPAnit, CLEAnANCE AND
CoLLEciox OF C Ecs (1926), 232, 269 et seq; note (1923) 37 HRv. L. Rxv.
133.
' Morris v. Cleve, 197 N. C. 253, 148 S. E. 256 (1929) suit by holder of a
check against the drawer; Braswell v. Citizens Nat. Bank, 197 N. C. 229, 148
S. E. 236 (1929) suit by holder against the collecting bank.
'For the purposes of clarity, reference in the text to "collecting bank" will
be to the final bank in the chain of collection between the depository bank and
the drawee. Since North Carolina follows the "Massachusetts rule" in regard
to liability of collecting banks, Bank of Rocky Mount v. Floyd, 142 N. C. 187,
55 S. E. 95 (1906), the final collecting bank, for the purposes of the discussion,
will bear the liability for loss due to non-payment of a check. For a dis-
cussion of the rule see note (1924) 13 CAL. L. Rxv. 231. See infra note 27.
'Davidson v. Allen, 276 Pac. 43 (Idaho 1929); Baldwin's Bank v. Smith,
215 N. Y. 76, 109 N. E. 138, L. R. A. 1918 F 1089. But see Litchfield v. Reid,
195 N. C. 161, 141 S. E. 543 (1928) discussed in note (1928) 6 N. C. L. Rv.
466. From a review of the cases it would, appear that under the noted situ-
ation the check is deemed paid only insofar as is necessary to hold the drawee
liable by reason of his acceptance. Ill. Trust and Say. Bank v. Northern Bank
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debt of the drawee to the drawer is at that time discharged and the
bank becomes the debtor of the payee. A drawer is also held to be
discharged when a collecting bank accepts from a drawee bank, a
draft in payment of a check forwarded by it for collection, even
though such acceptance be unauthorized; upon the ground that the
drawer, when he issues a check engages that it will be paid in money
if duly presented, and acceptance of anything else is at the payee's
risk.6 The drawer assumes the risk of loss due to the drawee's de-
fault while the check is in the ordinary course of collection but the
duration of his risk must not be extended without his consent. So,
a drawer may be discharged from liability when the loss is the result
of circuitous routing or delay in forwarding by an intermediate col-
lecting bank, or by any acts which extend his liability beyond the
time generally necessary to present a check and receive payment.7
Have these rules been changed by the statute permitting payment
in exchange drawn on reserve deposits? It was held by the Federal
Court in Cleve v. Craven Chemical Co.,S a case which squarely pre-
sented the question herein discussed, that the drawer was not dis-
charged; that since the drawer had not specified upon the check that
it be paid in cash, he impliedly agreed that, if the check should be
presented by or through a Federal Reserve bank, the drawee might
pay by exchange draft. So it would seem to follow that since the
drawer's discharge was formerly due to the acceptance of a draft
when money could have been demanded,9 he should now be held to
have consented to an extension of the period of his liability occa-
sioned by the acceptance of an exchange draft in payment of the
check.10
and Trust Co., 292 Ill. 11, 126 N. E. 533 (1920). Quaere, however, whether a
check would be paid so as to discharge the drawer when drawee made no re-
mittance. Nineteenth Ward Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 184 Mass. 49, 67 N. E.
670 (1903) ; or when drawee revokes payment after finding drawer had insuf-
ficient funds. Southern Stove Works v. Converse Say. Bank, 112 S. C. 230,
100 S. E. 75 (1919). See also Boatwright v. Rankin, 150 S. C. 374, 148 S. E.
214 (1929), to be discussed in a later issue.
'Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, 264 U. S. 160, 44 S. Ct. 296, 68 L. Ed.
617, 31 A. L. R. 1261 (1924) ; Jensen v. Laurel Meat Co., 71 Mont. 582, 2.30
Pac. 1081 (1924).
'N. I. L., §186; Sinclair Refining Co. v. Keith, 98 Okla. 55, 221 Pac. 1003
(1923); McEwen Bros. v. Cobb, 104 Misc. Rep. 477, 172 N. Y. Supp. 44
(1918) ; but see Empire-Arizona Copper Co. v. Shaw, 20 Ariz. 471, 181 Pac.
464, 4 A. L. R. 1229 and note (1917).8 Cleve v. Craven Chemical Co., 18 F. (2d) 711, 52 A. L. R. 980 (C. C. A.,
4th, 1927).
'Infra note 22.
"'Tarasek v. Kosciuszko Bldg. and Loan Assn., 218 Ill. App. 484 (1921),
holding drawer not discharged by delay in presentation when such delay is in-
duced by the drawer's request.
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There is appealing force in the argument, especially since the
apparent effect of the holding is to further protect the payee. As a
matter of fact, it is the drawer who has chosen the bank on which
the check is drawn and which he has trusted with his money. The
payee generally knows nothing of the bank and in taking the check
for value places his confidence in the drawer rather than the bank.
One is less likely to accept the check of a stranger drawn upon the
strongest bank in the country than that of a known responsible
drawer, upon a bank known to be weak.
The North Carolina court, however, upon facts identical with
those in the case referred to above, held that the drawer was dis-
charged; that since the statute was in derogation of the common-law
it should not be extended by implication in that direction further
than indicated by its terms. The expressed purpose of the statute
discloses no intention to deal with the rights and liabilities of the
parties to an instrument. It was also urged that the choice of the
agency for presentation rests with the payee11 and that his selection
of a Federal Reserve bank carried with it the authorization to accept
an exchange draft in payment.
It is submitted that the result reached by the North Carolina court
is practically more desirable.12 First, to hold the drawer liable neces-
sitates an extension of the law merchant to a point it did not previ-
ously reach in order to meet a situation arising unexpectedly from
the operation of the statute. Actually the practice here condoned is
merely what has been the overwhelmingly common usage and custom
for a long time, namely, the payment of collection items by drafts.' 3
'Theoretically it may be said that the choice does rest with the payee. He
may send a messenger and have it collected over the counter, but when his
depository bank is once engaged to collect the item, the payee has neither
choice nor knowledge as to its presentation.
'Apparently this suggestion has been elsewhere controverted. Jensen v.
Laurel Meat Co., supra note 6, held the drawer discharged as in the principal
case. In immediate repudiation of such result the Montana legislature passed
an act holding the drawer liable, but failing to state for what length of time.
Mont. Laws (1925), Ch. 65, S. B. 57. See note (1929) 4 WASH. L. Rav. 39.
Wyoming in 1923 passed an act holding the "maker" liable until final actual
payment to the collecting bank. Wyo. Laws (1923), Ch. 84, p. 1 and 2, which
right of action arising would normally become that of the payee's by subroga-
tion. Graham v. Warehouse, 189 N. C. 533, 127 S. E. 540 (1925). In 1925
an entirely new banking law was enacted, Wyo. Laws (1925), Ch. 157, §47,
from which the above maker's liability clause was omitted. It was again rein-
stated, however. Wyo. Laws (1927), Ch. 100, §47.
" See LANGSTON AND WHITNEY, BANKING PRACTICE (1921), pp. 102-3; 1
KNIrrIN, COMMEaCAL BANKING (1923), pp. 374-76; Noble v. Doughten, 72
Kan. 336, 83 Pac. 1048, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1167 (1905) ; note (1924) 24 CoL.
L. REv. 903.
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Secondly, if the drawer's liability is to be extended to protect the
payee in the case discussed, at what point in the course of collection
shall we discharge the drawer and hold that the check is paid? Cer-
tainly we cannot hold him until actual cash is finally received by the
payee or his depository bank. Under the credit basis of modem
banking his liability might be extended over an indefinite and often
unreasonable period.14 In truth, in the majority of banking transac-
tions money is never transferred at all. Shall we hold him until the
collecting bank has had an opportunity of accepting something in
payment of the remitted exchange draft? Such solution would afford
the payee little or no protection that he does not now have and would
not justify the promulgation of a rule, rather arbitrary in legal con-
templation and probably attended by the addition of a few more
parties to collection controversies.
Lastly, since North Carolina now has a statute' 5 giving the payee
a preference in the assets of the insolvent drawee it is quite probable
that a claim against the drawee is of more value than one against a
drawer who refuses to pay a debt, which, to speak as a layman, is
not actually paid. It is almost unheard of, that an insolvent bank
does not have sufficient funds to pay its preferred claims. By filing a
claim with the receivers a payee would be assured of payment within
a much shorter time than that required for a suit against the drawer.
(2) As to the payee's rights against the collecting bank.
The question presented in the Braswell case16 is whether or not,
under the statute, the collecting bank is relieved of the liability it
formerly had, for accepting a bank draft in payment of a check for-
warded by it for collection, when such draft is not paid upon pres-
entation.
An agent is liable to his principal, in the absence of an agreement
to the contrary, for the loss occasioned by his acceptance of anything
other than money in payment of a check.17 And this rule applies to
collecting banks.18 It is based upon the assumption that a check is
14 SPAHR, CLEARING AND COLLECTION OF CHECKS (1926), pp. 189, 462 et seq.
"N. C. Code (1927), §218 (c), subs. 14.
'"Supra note 3.
1 MECEEm, AGENCY (2d ed., 1914), §946.
Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, supra note 6; Jensen v. Laurel Meat
Co., supra note 6; but see Bank of Memphis v. Bank of Clarendon, 63 Tex.
Civ. App. 469, 134 S. W. 831 (1911) where collecting bank is held justified in
accepting exchange draft in payment by reason of prevailing custom and usage.
State v. Tyler County State Bank, 277 S. W. 625, 627, 42 A. L. R. 1347 and
note (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). For discussion of custom and usage as affecting
collecting bank's liability see note (1924) 24 COL. L. REV. 903.
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payable in cash and the agent accepts payment in any other medium
at his own risk.
In the Braswell case19 Connor, J., says that the payee must be
held to have authorized acceptance of a draft since he must have
known that the collecting bank would avail itself of the postoffice as
a means by which presentment would be made.20 Therefore the
payee cannot hold the bank liable. It has been held that the North
Carolina statute does not change the rule that a check is payable only
in cash.2 1 Why should it not then follow that the collecting bank is
authorized to present the check only in such manner as will enable it
to demand cash ?22 A strong argument advanced in Morris v. Cleve23
is that statutes in derogation of the common-law must be strictly con-
strued under the limitation that the legislature will be presumed not
to intend innovations upon the common-law, further than is indicated
by their express terms. In the case of the Federal Reserve Bank v.
Malloy,24 where the plaintiff contended that a statute permitting for-
warding direct to the drawee, also by implication carries with it the
" Supra note 3.
" Infra note 22.
' Farmers' and Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, supra note 1;
see Dewey v. Margolis, infra note 22.
" In an admirable brief of the plaintiff appellant in the Braswell case it was
forcefully argued that the statute permitting payment by draft was inapplicable.
The check in that case had not been routed through the Federal Reserve Bank
but had been sent by mail direct to the drawee by the collecting bank. The
contention was that there was no presentment by the postoffice. Where a check
is mailed direct to the drawee, it is held that the drawee is the agent for the
purpose of presenting to itself. Smith v. Mitchell, 117 Ga. 772, 45 S. E. 47;
note (1927) 52 A. L. R. 1001. It is obvious therefore that the court reached
its result by construing this as presentment, "through" the postoflice. It must
be admitted that the word "through" in the statute was not merely repetitious
but was actually intended. Otherwise the Federal Reserve might have avoided
the statute by forwarding items to another bank with instructions to present
over the counter and demand cash. Since North Carolina follows the "Massa-
chusetts rule" the presenting bank would be the agent of the payee to present
and not of the prior bank in the chain of collection, and the above transaction
would not be included in the phrase, "or any respective agent thereof." But
if the foregoing is true it must follow that a check comes within the operation
of the statute if it at any time in the course of collection comes into the hands
of the postoffice. That such result was not intended by the legislature cannot
be -denied. See Dewey v. Margolis, 195 N. C. 307, 311, 142 S. E. 22 (1928),
where when a check was presented as in the Braswell case, the court says, "It
('the collecting bank) had the right to demand that the check of the defend-
ants be paid in money. It waived this right at its own risk and not at the risk
of the defendants." See also Quarles v. Taylor, 195 N. C. 313, 142 S. E. 25
(1928) ; Farmers' and Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U S.
649, 658, 659, supra note 1.
' Supra note 3.
' Supra note 6.
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authority to accept a draft in payment, the court said, "But to justify
an extension by implication of the terms of the regulation, it must
be made to appear at least that the addition sought to be annexed is
a necessary means to carry into effect the authority expressly given
by the regulation." Accordingly, the inquiry becomes, does a statute
authorizing the drawee to pay checks by exchange drafts in certain
instances, carry with it the authority for a collecting bank to take
such a course of collection as will force it to accept such payment?
It is submitted that it does not unless all possible methods of
presentment come within the operation of the statute.25  In view of
the present turbid state of the laws pertaining to bank collections,
the result of the varied constructions and interpretations advanced in
the clash between statutory enactments and the law merchant, it would
probably be wise to leave it to the legislature2 6 to provide for the
result reached in the instant case. 27  HARRY RocxwELL.
'It is said that if two or more courses of collection are open to a collect-
ing bank, one of which may prove damaging to the payee, the bank is liable if
4damage does result frompursuing that course. Federal Land Bank v. Barrow,
189 N. C. 303, 309, 127, S. E. 3, 6 (1925). But see supra note 22. Apparently
the only course of collection open not affected by the statute is to send the
check by a personal agent, a practice so obviously inconceivable as to be
humorous. The net effect of the deductions referred to is to make checks
drawn on banks in this state non-negotiable by reason of their being payable
in something other than cash. It may be argued that since it is still possible
at all events to require payment in cash that negotiability has not been destroyed.
Yet the doctrine of negotiability is a child of the law merchant which has as
its foundation the practices of the commercial world. It cannot therefore be
defined in terms foreign to commercial practice. See Note (1923) 33 YALE
L. J. 752, 759, fn. 23.
"The American Banker's Association's proposed Bank Collection Code has
now been adopted in the following states: Ind. Acts (1929), Ch. 164; Md.
Laws (1929), Ch ....... ; Mo. Laws (1929), p. 205; Neb. Laws (1929), Ch. 41;
N. J. Laws (1929), Ch ....... ; N. M. Laws (1929), Ch. 138; N. Y. Laws (1929),
Ch. 589; Wash. Laws (1929), Ch ....... ; Wis. Laws (1929), Ch ........
One of the interesting changes effected by the Act is to introduce the
"'Massachusetts rule" into New Jersey, New York, New Mexico and Wiscon-
sin, states which formerly followed the "New York rule" of collecting bank
liability.
(a) §350 (f) of the N. Y. statute reads: "When an item is received by mail
by a solvent drawee or payor bank it shall be deemed paid when the amount
is finally charged to the account of the maker or drawer." §350 1 (2) contains:
"... after having charged such item to the account of the maker or drawer
thereof or otherwise discharged his liability thereon ... ." Yet Mr. Brady,
editor of the BANKING LAW JOURNAL, observes that in a case such as is dis-
cussed in the text the drawer remains liable, under §350 j. See (1929) 46 B. L.
J. 755. The Code as adopted by Missouri does not have a section corresponding
to §350 f of the N. Y. statute. The Committee on Uniform Act on Collection
by Banks are at work on a Bank Collection Act which it is hoped will remedy
the deficiencies of the Bankers Association Code.
"
1 The effect of a contrary decision had it been reached in the Braswell case
would immediately have been avoided by banks by the use of deposit slip
